Robust Privacy-Utility Tradeoffs Under Differential Privacy and Hamming Distortion by Kalantari, Kousha et al.
1Robust Privacy-Utility Tradeoffs
under Differential Privacy and Hamming
Distortion
Kousha Kalantari Student Member, IEEE, Lalitha Sankar Senior Member, IEEE,
and Anand D. Sarwate Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract
A privacy utility tradeoff is developed for any arbitrary set of finite-alphabet source distributions. Privacy is
quantified using differential privacy (DP), and utility is quantified using expected Hamming distortion maximized
over the set of distributions. The family of source distribution sets (source sets) is categorized into three classes,
based on different levels of prior knowledge they capture: (i) for Class I source sets, defined as sets whose convex
hull includes the uniform point, the optimal DP mechanism is shown to be symmetric; (ii) for Class II source sets,
comprised of distributions that are not in Class I and are restricted to have an order imposed on the distribution, the
optimal mechanism is shown to exploit the source knowledge to provide more privacy to the outliers; and (iii) for
all remaining source sets, which are neither Class I nor Class II, henceforth defined as Class III, bounds on optimal
leakage are developed; these bounds are shown to be tight for Class III sets satisfying a specific property. To get
a better understanding of DP under Hamming distortion, numerical comparisons to information theoretic leakage is
provided, and analytical comparisons are developed for specific distortion ranges.
Index Terms
Utility-privacy tradeoff, differential privacy, information leakage, Hamming distortion
I. INTRODUCTION
The differential privacy (DP) framework offers strong guarantees on the risk of identifying an individual’s presence
in a database from public disclosures of functions of that database [3]. This metric has been applied to a variety of
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2computational tasks where privacy guarantees are required, especially in theoretical computer science, databases,
and machine learning. The monograph of Dwork and Roth [4] gives an in-depth treatment of the fundamentals;
a shorter survey attuned to signal processing [5] has also appeared. A key aspect of this approach to privacy is
the introduction of randomness into the computation that helps limit the privacy risk. However, guaranteeing a
tight bound on privacy risk often incurs a significant penalty in terms of the usefulness of the published result.
Fundamentally, differential privacy is a property of the distribution of the computation’s output conditioned on its
input. In this paper we seek to understand how this conditional distribution distorts the input for the task of data
publishing. We study this privacy-utility tradeoff in the context of publishing a differentially private approximation
of the full dataset and measure utility via a distortion measure.
In many applications the data collector may be required to publish a version of the dataset, but may also know
something a priori about the underlying population distribution from existing public data or previously published
statistics. In particular, they may know that some values are more likely than others, or may know something about
the distribution up to the labeling of the alphabet. Motivated by these observations, we assume that for a given
dataset the set of possible distributions is known, but its exact distribution is unknown.
In order to capture this uncertainty, we model utility as the maximum Hamming distortion over the entire source
set. In many datasets, a vast majority of the attributes are categorical data for which Hamming distortion is a natural
metric and privacy mechanisms using additive noise would not make sense. The assumption is that all that matters
is whether the original data was altered or not, which is captured by Hamming distortion. We will show that the
optimal mechanism guarantees the minimal leakage by effectively mapping low-probability symbols (which are
most informative) to the others.
A. Our Contributions
This paper extends previous results on binary sources [2] to general finite alphabets under Hamming distortion.
Larger alphabet sizes permit more complex structures for source distribution sets (which we call source sets). We
classify source sets into three classes as illustrated in Figure 1.
• Class I: Source sets whose convex hull includes the uniform distribution. For example, see the blue source
set in Figure 1.
For Class I sources we show that the symmetric mechanism is optimal. This is because sources of this class
are the least informative ones, and thus, guaranteeing both utility and privacy for all distributions requires a
symmetric privacy mapping.
• Class II: Source sets that are not Class I, and have ordered statistics. That is, there is a permutation of the
alphabet such that all distributions in the class have monotonically decreasing probability mass functions. For
example, in Figure 1, we have P1 ≥ P2 ≥ P3.
Here, we exploit the ordering of all the distributions in the source set to develop a more refined result.
Furthermore, we use this ordering to present five properties for the optimal mechanism, using a coloring
argument that distinguishes between the elements of the mapping matrix with highest, lowest, and other
values. Our results for this class show that as the distortion increases, we can consider mechanisms for which
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3the output support set is smaller and does not include the least likely letters of the input alphabet. The optimal
mechanism is shown to exploit the source knowledge to provide more privacy to the outliers, i.e. the least
likely and most informative elements of the dataset.
• Class III: All source sets that cannot be classified as Class I or Class II. An example is depicted in Figure 1.
We first show that any arbitrary source set can be written as a union of Class II subsets, each having a different
ordering. Then we use the results from Class II source sets to obtain bounds. In fact, this is done by mapping
all these different subsets into a very specific single Class II partition, and using the union and intersection of
these mappings we develop upper and lower bounds, respectively.
Finally to get a better sense of the privacy utility tradeoff under differential privacy we compare it with another
regret framework of using mutual information as the privacy metric. We formulate the same min-max optimization
problem using mutual information as the privacy metric. Then, we show that for certain ranges of distortion we
can obtain tight bounds and we present numerical comparison.
 
 
𝑃1 
𝑃3 
𝑃2 
Class I 𝒫 
Class II 𝒫 
Class III 𝒫 
Fig. 1: All three classes of source sets for M = 3.
B. Related Work
There is a growing body of work on differential privacy (DP) the survey of which is beyond the scope of this
paper; we refer the curious reader to the monograph [4]. However, comparing differential privacy to other approaches
with rigorous guarantees is still a nascent area of research.
Mutual information (MI) has been proposed as a metric for privacy leakage (see, for example, [6]–[8]) in a variety
of settings including data communications, publishing, and mining. One of the earliest works comparing differential
privacy and mutual information privacy is by Alvim et. al. [9], [10]. Mutual information based privacy metrics have
also been considered for data streaming applications. see, for example [11]–[13]. In [14], the authors compare
mutual information privacy with differential privacy under Hamming distortion. They also introduce a new privacy
measure called identifiability and highlight its relationship to MI and DP. Building upon [9], the authors in [15]
introduce maximal leakage (ML) as an information leakage measure for a guessing adversary; they also present
a comparison of ML and DP in [16]. Recently, the authors in [17] present an equivalent definition of differential
privacy using mutual information.
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4In this paper we consider utility metrics based on rate-distortion. A rate-distortion approach to mutual information
privacy has been also considered by many researchers (see, for example, [18]–[21]). The present paper extends and
generalizes our earlier work [22].
Our goal here is to evaluate the behavior of the optimal mechanism for differential privacy, and make meaningful
comparisons to mutual information privacy. Our work is distinct in studying the optimal DP mechanisms for
a specific utility metric, i.e., Hamming distortion, under the assumption that complete source knowledge is not
available to design the mechanism for a desired distortion. In this context we develop closed form solutions and
tight bounds. Finally, we use these results to make meaningful comparisons between mutual information privacy
and differential privacy.
Local differential privacy (L-DP) [23]–[27] studies scenarios in which each data respondent, independently
applies the same privacy mechanism. Recently, Kairouz et al. [28] determined the optimal local differential privacy
mechanism for a class of utility functions that satisfy a sub-linearity property and show that the resulting L-DP
mechanism has a staircase property, meaning that the ratio of any two conditional probabilities leading to same
outputs is in {1, c, c−1}, where c is some constant. However, while Hamming distortion is a sub-linear utility
function, the worst case distortion over a source class is not. Therefore, the results in [28] cannot be applied. In
fact, the optimal mechanism admits the staircase property only for class I source sets.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let the alphabet X represent data collected about an individual. As a special case, X can be a Cartesian product
of other alphabet sets, i.e. X = ∏Kk=1 Xk, where Xk is the set of possible values for kth attribute measured about
an individual. Given an individual’s data X ∈ X , our goal is to find a conditional distribution QXˆ|X that maps
the input data X to an output data Xˆ with same alphabet size as X . Our objective is to find a QXˆ|X that is both
privacy preserving and does not distort the data above some threshold.
We model the data of individuals being drawn from a distribution PX on X , but that particular PX is not
fully known. Let P indicate a subset of probability simplex to which the source distribution PX belongs. For any
PX ∈ P , let QXˆ|X and PX,Xˆ = PXQXˆ|X indicate the mechanism and the joint distribution of input and output
data, respectively. When it is clear from context, we may drop the subscripts and simply use P and Q instead of
PX and QXˆ|X . We write Pi for PX(X = i) for i ∈ X .
Also, let T be a permutation on {1, . . . ,M}, such that T (i) is the ith element in the permuted sequence, and
T−1(j) is the index of element j in the permuted sequence. Throughout the sequel, We also refer to the permuted
version of a source distribution P as T (P ), which is in fact another distribution Pˆ , such that for all i, we have
PˆT (i) = Pi. Furthermore, we write T−1(Pˆ ) to denote the original distribution P . The notation T (P) (respectively
T−1(P)) then implies that the permutation T (respectively T−1) is applied to every P ∈ P .
We will categorize any possibility of a distribution set P in three main classes of source distribution sets, and
we will study each of them separately in the rest of this article.
Definition 1: A source set P falls into one of the following classes:
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5• A source set P is of Class I if its convex hull conv(P) includes the uniform distribution Pi = 1M for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
• A source set P is of Class II if it is not Class I and there exists a single permutation T (·) such that for every
distribution P = (P1, P2, P3, . . . , PM ) ∈ P , we have PT (1) ≥ PT (2) ≥ PT (3) ≥ · · · ≥ PT (M).
• Any other source set is defined to be of Class III.
Remark 1: Without loss of generality, for Class II source sets we assume P1 ≥ P2 ≥ . . . ≥ PM .
We measure the distortion between X and Xˆ using Hamming distortion, i.e. d(x, y) = 1 if x 6= y, and d(x, y) = 0
if x = y. Hence, for a finite set X we can assume X = Xˆ = {1, 2, 3, . . . ,M} without loss of generality. The
average distortion is then given as EX,Xˆ [d(X, Xˆ)]. To indicate the the dependence of the average distortion on
the source distribution and the mechanism we write EPX ,QXˆ|X [d(X, Xˆ)]. For Hamming distortion, the average
distortion is
∑M
i=1 Pi(1 − Q(i|i)). Thus, we can simplify the Q matrix by defining Di = 1 − Q(i|i) for all i.
Henceforth, it suffices to consider mechanisms Q(j|i) with the following form:
[QXˆ|X ]ij =

1−D1 Q(2|1) . . . Q(M |1)
Q(1|2) 1−D2 . . . Q(M |2)
...
...
. . .
...
Q(1|M) Q(2|M) . . . 1−DM
 .
The sub-matrix of Q induced by rows from imin to imax and columns from jmin to jmax is written as Q(jmin :
jmax|imin : imax).
Definition 2: A mechanism QXˆ|X , or equivalently its corresponding distortion set {Di}Mi=1, is called (P, D)-valid
if it satisfies the average distortion constraint for every PX ∈ P . The set of all (P, D)-valid mechanisms is
Q(P, D) ,
{
QXˆ|X : E
[
d(X, Xˆ)
]
≤ D, ∀PX ∈ P
}
.
We use the same model for local differential privacy as Kairouz et al. [28], as formalized by Kasiviswanathan
et al. [25] based on the randomized response mechanism of Warner [23] generalized by Evfimievski et al. [24]. It
is stronger than non-local privacy [29] and implies local -differential privacy [28], but allows for columns of Q to
be all-0:
Definition 3: A mechanism QXˆ|X is -differentially private (-DP) if
Q(xˆ|x1) ≤ eQ(xˆ|x2) for all x1, x2 ∈ X , xˆ ∈ Xˆ , (1)
and
DP(QXˆ|X) , min
{
 : Q(xˆ|x1) ≤ eQ(xˆ|x2)
for all x1, x2 ∈ X , xˆ ∈ Xˆ
}
.
(2)
Remark 2: Note that the privacy parameter  does not depend on the source class P .
Remark 3: For a finite  > 0, an -differentially private mechanism is such that every column has either all non-
zero or all zero entries, i.e. there cannot be a zero and a non-zero entry in the same column. Thus, any mechanism
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6achieving finite DP(·) can have M −k non-zero columns and k all-zero columns for some integer 0 ≤ k ≤M −1.
Also note that DP(QXˆ|X) ≥ 0 for any QXˆ|X .
Note that D = 0 (perfect utility) implies that Xˆ = X , i.e. the optimal mechanism is an identity matrix Q with
DP(Q) =∞. Thus, we focus only on D > 0 in the sequel.
Lemma 1: DP(·) is convex in QXˆ|X .
Proof: See Section V-A.
From Definitions 2 and 3, the minimal achievable -DP for a given distribution set under Hamming distortion is
defined as follows.
Definition 4: For a source distribution set P , and a distortion D, where 0 < D ≤ 1, let
∗DP(P, D) , min
QXˆ|X∈Q(P,D)
DP(QXˆ|X) ≥ 0. (3)
Also denote the set of all Q ∈ Q(P, D) that achieve (3) by Q∗(P, D).
A. Worst-case distortion is not sub-linear
The worst-case distortion for a mechanism Q is maxP∈P
∑M
i=1 PiDi. Since 
∗
DP(P, D) is decreasing in D,
instead of minimizing leakage for a limited worst-case distortion, we can minimize worst-case distortion for limited
leakage. Hence, one can formulate the optimization problem in (3) as
min
Q∈Q
max
P∈P
M∑
i=1
PiDi = max
Q∈Q
U(Q), (4)
where utility U(Q) = −maxP∈P
∑M
i=1 PiDi, and Q is the set of all -DP mechanisms.
Kairouz et al. [28] show the optimality of staircase mechanisms for U satisfying U(γQ) = γU(Q) and U(Q1 +
Q2) ≤ U(Q1) + U(Q2); they call such U sub-linear. We show by example that our utility is not sublinear. Let
M = 2 and consider two mechanisms Q1 and Q2 with distortions D(1) = {1, 0} and D(2) = {0, 1} respectively,
as well as a source set P = {P (1) = (1, 0), P (2) = (0, 1)}. Then:
−max
P∈P
M∑
i=1
Pi
(
D
(1)
i +D
(2)
i
)
> −max
P∈P
M∑
i=1
PiD
(1)
i −max
P∈P
M∑
i=1
PiD
(2)
i . (5)
III. MAIN RESULTS
In the prior work in [1], the authors conjecture that the optimal differentially private (DP) mechanism for a
discrete source of alphabet size M and distortion level D is
QD(j|i) ,
1−D, i = j,D
M−1 , i 6= j.
(6)
In the following, we show that the achievable scheme in (6) is tight for Class I source classes; for the Class II source
sets, we exactly characterize ∗DP(P, D) and show that it matches to that of (6) for well-defined subsets of D ∈ (0, 1],
specifically for high and low utility regimes. Finally, we characterize the optimal leakage for Class III source sets
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7of any other form. Note that, ∗DP(P, D) = 0 is achievable for D ≥ M−1M by Q(j|i) = 1M , 1 ≤ i ≤M, 1 ≤ j ≤M ,
for any source set of any class.
Remark 4: For Hamming distortion, any source set P can be replaced with its convex hull without loss of
generality, i.e. the corresponding minimal leakage would remain the same. Hence, we can always assume P is
convex.
Proof: See Section V-B.
Lemma 2: For a source set P of Class II in the general form of PT (1) ≥ PT (2) ≥ · · · ≥ PT (M) for any
P ∈ P and some permutation T , there exists an optimal mechanism whose corresponding set of {Di} satisfy
DT (1) ≤ DT (2) ≤ · · · ≤ DT (M).
Proof: See Section V-C.
Theorem 1: For any source set P of Class I, we have
∗DP(P, D) =
log(M − 1)
1−D
D , D ∈ [0, M−1M ),
0, D ∈ [M−1M , 1].
(7)
Proof sketch: Since the source set includes the uniform point, i.e. the worst distribution, there is no choice other
than applying a symmetric mechanism as if there is no knowledge available. For a detailed proof see Section V-D.
We now proceed to Class II source sets, where there is a known order on the probability of each outcome. For
such source sets, we use a coloring argument on the entries of Q to prove specific properties that hold for any
optimal mechanism. This, in turn, helps us to reduce the dimension of the feasible space and derive the optimal
leakage in terms of a minimization over only M diagonal entries of the mechanism. This is formally stated in
Theorem 2.
Since utility is a statistical quantity, the statistical knowledge about the source class can be exploited to obtain a
better mechanism than the symmetric one. As the distortion increases, i.e. lower utility is allowed, the size of the
output space can decrease. Conversely, for increasing utility, i.e. decreasing distortion, the output space cannot be
smaller than a certain size. This leads to a collection of distortion thresholds D(k) at which an additional decrease
in output size becomes optimal.
In addition to this observation, we also use the properties of -DP, and in fact properties of any optimal mechanism,
to reduce the dimension of the feasible space from M2 to just M entries.
Theorem 2: For a Class II source set P with ordered statistics:
(a) There is no (P, D)-valid mechanism with k or more all-zero columns for D < D(k), where D0 , 0 and
D(k) , max
P∈P
M∑
i=M−k+1
Pi, 1 ≤ k ≤M. (8)
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8(b) The optimal leakage is
∗DP(P, D) =
log
(
(M − 1) 1−DD
)
, 0 < D < D(1) ,
min
l∈{0,1,...k}

(l)∗
DP:II(P, D),
D(k) ≤ D < D(k+1),
k ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 2}
0, D(M−1) ≤ D ≤ 1 ,
(9)
where the minimum leakage achievable over all (P, D)-valid mechanisms with exactly k all-zero columns is
given by

(k)∗
DP:II(P, D) ,
min
{Di}M−ki=1
log(M − 1− k)1−
∑M−k
i=2 Di
M−1−k
D1
subject to

∑M−k
i=1 PiDi ≤ D −D(k), ∀P ∈ P,∑M−k
i=1 Di ≤M − 1− k.
(10)
and the subscript DP:II in (9) and (10) denote the Class II source set.
Proof sketch: The proof hinges on the fact that for a Class II source set, where we have a complete knowledge
on the order of the source distribution probabilities, the dimension of the variable space that we need to optimize
over reduces to only M instead of M2. For a detailed proof see Section V-E.
We now consider the Class III source sets. We will show that the optimal mechanism for Class III source sets
can be obtained from results for Class II source sets. As a first step to presenting the main result for Class III
source sets, we introduce the following notation and definitions.
Let S0 be the set of all Class II distributions with decreasingly ordered probabilities. Formally,
S0 , {P : P1 ≥ P2 ≥ . . . ≥ PM}. (11)
Note that the simplex of distributions can be partitioned into M ! such ordered subsets, one for each permutation
of {1, . . . ,M}, and thus, there are a total of M !− 1 other subregions similar to S0. For example, for M = 3, as
shown in Figure 2, the simplex is a union of six disjoint ordered sets. More generally, a subset P of the simplex is
a union of distributions P that lie in one or more ordered partitions. For a source distribution P belonging to any
one of these partitions, there exists a corresponding folding permutation T such that PT (1) ≥ PT (2) ≥ . . . ≥ PT (M),
or equivalently T (P ) ∈ S0. Specifically, any Class III source set P can be written as a disjoint union of Class II
source sets using what we call folding permutations.
Definition 5: Given a Class III source set P , its folding permutation set TP is the set of all permutations T , for
which there exists at least one P ∈ P with PT (1) ≥ PT (2) ≥ · · · ≥ PT (M). Then, for each T ∈ TP define
P|T , {P ∈ P : PT (1) ≥ PT (2) ≥ · · · ≥ PT (M)}. (12)
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9Thus, a Class III source set P is a union of Class II source sets, i.e. P = ∪
T∈TP
P|T . For example, the source
set P in Fig. 3 lies in three partitions, with corresponding folding permutations T1, T2, and T3. Thus, P|Ti is the
intersection of P with the partition whose folding permutation is Ti, i = 1, 2, 3, such that P = P|T1 ∪P|T2 ∪P|T3 .
Without loss of generality, we only focus on those Class III source sets P that have a non-empty intersection
with S0. This is due to the fact that for any other Class III source set, the optimal mechanism can be found using
a similar analysis with appropriate change of indices. We now show that for any such Class III source set P , the
optimal leakage can be bounded using the result in Theorem 2. We do so by mapping each P|T into S0, using its
corresponding permutation.
Definition 6: For any permutation function T ∈ TP , we define a folded equivalent of P|T as its mapped image
to S0, defined as
P|T ,
{
P ∈ S0 : ∃P ∈ P|T s.t. P = T (P )
}
. (13)
Furthermore, let
P∩ , ∩
T∈TP
P|T , P∪ , ∪
T∈TP
P|T . (14)
Clearly, P∩ ⊆ P∪ ⊆ S0, and thus, P∩ and P∪ are Class II source sets. This is depicted in Figure 3.
P1
P3
P2
Class III 𝒫
𝓢𝟎
𝓟ቚ
𝑻𝟏
𝓟ቚ
𝑻𝟐
𝓟ቚ
𝑻𝟑
Fig. 2: A Class III source set P .
P1
P3
P2𝒮0
∪
P1
P3
P2𝒮0
∩
Fig. 3: a Class III source set P .
We now proceed to our main result for Class III source sets.
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Theorem 3: Let P be a Class III source set, such that P∩ and P∪ are non-empty. Then
∗DP:III(P∩, D, TP) ≤ ∗DP(P, D) ≤ ∗DP:III(P∪, D, TP), (15)
where for any Class II source set PII and a folding permutation set T we have:
∗DP:III(PII, D, T ) ,
log
(
(M − 1) 1−DD
)
, 0 < D < D(1) ,
min
l∈{0,1,...M}

(l)∗
DP:III(PII, D, T ), D(1) ≤ D < M−1M ,
0, M−1
M ≤ D ≤ 1 ,
(16)
with

(k)∗
DP:III(PII, D, T ) ,
min
{Di}M−ki=1
log(M − 1− k)1−
∑M−k
i=2 Di
M−1−k
D1
subject to

∑M−k
i=1 PiDi ≤ D −D(k), ∀P ∈ PII,∑M−k
i=1 Di ≤M − 1− k,
DT (i) = Di, ∀T ∈ T , 1 ≤ i ≤M.
(17)
Proof sketch: For any Class III source set, one can determine P∩ and P∪ located inside S0, as shown in Figure
3. The bound results from focusing on P∩ and P∪, and mapping them back using the inverses of all permutations
in TP . The union of all these mapped sets forms PLB and PUB, which is contained in and contains P , respectively.
However, PLB and PUB have this specific property that their corresponding leakage can be calculated from applying
theorem 2 on P∩ and P∪, with an additional constraint of Di = DT (i), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ M and T ∈ TP . See
Section V-F for a detailed proof.
Remark 5: In the special case where P∩ = ∅, ∗DP(P, D) can be simply lower bounded by ∗DP(P ∩ S0, D).
Remark 6: Observe that (k)
∗
DP:II in (10) and 
(k)∗
DP:III in (17) differ in an additional constraint. This comes from the
fact that the image of PLB and PUB in each Class II partition is similar, and therefore, forces some distortion values
to be equal.
Corollary 1: For P∩ = P∪, we have
∗DP(P∩, D) = ∗DP(P, D) = ∗DP(P∪, D). (18)
Remark 7: If P∩ = P∪, then the upper and lower bound match, and the minimal leakage is equal to that of P∩
obtained by Theorem 2, with the additional constraint Di = DT (i), for all 1 ≤ i ≤M and T ∈ TP .
A. Information theoretic leakage
Another metric used for leakage is the mutual information between the original and released data, often referred
to as “information theoretic (IT) leakage”. Unlike DP leakage that provides worst case guarantees, IT leakage
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provides average case guarantees for all entries of a dataset by taking the statistics of the data into account. Another
difference between the two is the fact that for any given mechanism, the IT leakage is not only a function of the
mechanism PXˆ|X , but also it is dependent on the specific data distribution PX . For known source distributions,
information theoretic leakage is studied in [18], [19], [22], where both asymptotic and non-asymptotic results are
derived. However, for the case wherein the source distribution is not known precisely, but some knowledge of source
distribution is available, then the worst-case IT leakage of any mechanism Q is defined in [1] as:
IT(Q) = max
P∈P
I(P ;Q), (19)
such that the minimal information theoretic leakage is defined as
∗IT(P, D) = min
Q∈Q(P,D)
IT(Q) = min
Q∈Q(P,D)
max
P∈P
I(P ;Q). (20)
Note that it is not in general straightforward to get analytical closed form results for ∗IT(P, D) for any P and a
desired utility function. However, we can characterize its general behavior and use that to make comparisons with
DP. Since any mechanism Q that is (P, D)-valid for two source distributions P1 and P2, is also valid for any convex
combination of P1 and P2 as well, any source distribution set P can be replaced with its convex hull without loss
of generality. As a result, the set of valid mechanisms Q(P, D) is also convex. Also note that both P and Q(P, D)
are compact, i.e. closed and bounded, and mutual information is convex in conditional distribution and convex in
source distribution. Therefore, according to the minimax theorem [30] we can conclude that the minimax inequality
holds as equality and we have:
∗IT(P, D) = min
Q∈Q(P,D)
max
P∈P
I(P ;Q)
= max
P∈P
min
Q∈Q(P,D)
I(P ;Q). (21)
We stress that IT leakage and DP leakage are not comparable directly and in fact their numerical values reflect
two very different privacy sensitivity models.
However, for a common utility function, and a given source set, it is worthwhile to compare their performance.
To this end, we present some analytical results under IT leakage for source classes I and II.
Lemma 3: For any Class I source set P , we have
∗IT(P, D) =
logM −H(D)−D log(M − 1), D <
M−1
M ,
0, D ≥ M−1M .
(22)
Proof: We first show that ∗IT(P, D) = 0, if D ≥ M−1M . Consider the mechanism which maps every letter of
the input alphabet to the first letter. This mechanism results in a distortion of M−1M and achieves 
∗
IT(P, D) = 0,
because the resulting output distribution is totally independent of the input.
We now proceed to the case where D < M−1M . Recall that P is of Class I and includes the uniform point.
Since IT leakage is a concave function of P ∈ P , for any given mechanism Q the resulting worst case IT
leakage is the one corresponding to the uniform source distribution. Furthermore, the convexity of IT leakage in
the conditional distribution implies that given a mechanism QXˆ|X , for any permutation T , QT (Xˆ)|T (X) yields the
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same IT leakage for the uniform source. This, in turn, implies that there exists an optimal mechanism with equal
diagonal elements, and equal off-diagonal elements that are not necessarily equal to the diagonal values. Therefore,
the following mechanism is optimal:
Q(j|i) =
1−D, i = j,D
M−1 , i 6= j,
(23)
and the resulting worst case IT leakage, i.e. the one corresponding to the uniform source, is given by
I(X; Xˆ) =
∑
x,xˆ
p(x, xˆ) log
p(xˆ|x)
p(xˆ)
=
∑
x,xˆ
p(x, xˆ) log
p(xˆ|x)
1
M
= −H(Xˆ|X) + logM
= (1−D) log(1−D) +D log D
M − 1 + logM
= −H(D)−D log(M − 1) + logM. (24)
Lemma 4: For any Class II source set P , ∗IT(P, D) = 0 iff D ≥ D(M−1).
Proof: Let D ≥ D(M−1) and P ∗ ∈ P be the distribution achieving the maximum in definition of D(M−1)
in (8). Consider a mechanism that maps every input independently to the output element of P ∗ with the highest
probability. One can verify that the resulting distortion is D(M−1) ≤ D. Furthermore, one can also verify that for
this mechanism I(X; Xˆ) = 0.
We now show that no mechanism can achieve I(X; Xˆ) = 0, if D < D(M−1). Without loss of generality, let
P1 ≥ P2 ≥ . . . ≥ PM . Assume to the contrary that there exists a Qˆ achieving ∗IT(P, D) = 0 for some D < D(M−1).
Since I(X; Xˆ) = 0, P (xˆ|x) = p(xˆ) for all x. This in turn result in a distortion at least equal to ∑Mi=2 P ∗i , which
is equal to D(M−1), and thus, Qˆ cannot be (P, D)-valid.
IV. ILLUSTRATION OF RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate our theoretical results for specific examples of the three source classes. Recall that
for Class I, irrespective of the specific chosen source set, the optimal leakage is always achieved by the symmetric
mechanism. For Class II sources, we consider two source sets P(6)II and P(10)II cases with M = 6 and M = 10,
where P(6)II is only a single point in the simplex given in Table I, and P(10)II is a line segment with endpoints given
in Table II.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
0.7 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02
TABLE I: P(6)II with M = 4
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
0.3 0.2 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.35 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
TABLE II: P(10)II with M = 10
Finally, for Class III sources, we use the same Class II source sets P(6)II and P(10)II , together with their permuted
copies, to generate class III source sets. In order to generate P(6)III: a, we use the probability vector in P(6)II , in addition
to the vector obtained by swapping the first two elements in P(6)II . For generating P(6)III: b, the first and third elements
of P(6)II are swapped and added to P(6)III: a. Similarly, for P(6)III: c, the first and fourth elements of P(6)II are swapped
and added to P(6)III: b. We do the same for P(10)II to get P(10)III: a , P(10)III: b, and P(10)III: c . The resulting corner points of the
region are shown in Tables III and IV, respectively.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
c

b

a
 0.7 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.020.15 0.7 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.06 0.15 0.7 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.04 0.15 0.06 0.7 0.03 0.02
TABLE III: P(6)III: a, P(6)III: b, and P(6)III: c with M = 6.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
c

b

a

0.3 0.2 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.35 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.2 0.3 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.16 0.35 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.15 0.2 0.3 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.12 0.16 0.35 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.08 0.2 0.15 0.3 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.10 0.16 0.12 0.35 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
TABLE IV: P(10)III: a , P(10)III: b, and P(10)III: c with M = 10.
In Figs. 4 and 5, we illustrate the minimal DP leakage for all three classes described above with M = 6 and
M = 10, respectively.
Additionally, comparisons of DP versus IT leakage are provided for Class I and Class II source sets in Figs. 6
and 7, respectively. One can verify that IT leakage is convex in D, as observed in Fig. 6 and 7, while this is not
true for DP leakage in general. Note that, as expected, DP leakage is lower bounded by IT leakage. Moreover, as
shown in Lemmas 3 and 4, both DP and IT achieve perfect privacy at the same distortion values.
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Fig. 4: DP leakage-distortion tradeoff for class I, class II, and class III source sets with M = 6.
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Fig. 5: DP leakage-distortion tradeoff for class I, class II, and class III source sets with M = 10.
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Fig. 6: Differential Privacy vs Information Theoretic Leakage for Class I source sets and M = 10.
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Fig. 7: Differential Privacy vs Information Theoretic Leakage for P(10)II in Table II.
V. PROOFS
A. Proof of Lemma 1: Convexity of DP(·) in Q
Based on the definition of convexity in [31], it suffices to show that if two different mechanisms Q1 and Q2 are -
differentially private mechanisms for some finite , then their convex combination Qθ = θQ1+(1−θ)Q2, 0 < θ < 1,
is also -differentially private. Let x1 and x2 be two arbitrary input elements, and let xˆ be an arbitrary output element.
We have
Qθ(xˆ|x1) = θQ1(xˆ|x1) + (1− θ)Q2(xˆ|x1) (25a)
≤ θQ1(xˆ|x2)e + (1− θ)Q2(xˆ|x2)e (25b)
= eQθ(xˆ|x2). (25c)
Therefore, Qθ is also -differentially private, and thus DP(·) is a convex function.
B. Proof of Remark 4: Convexity of P
This is due to the fact that any (P, D)-valid mechanism should be also valid for any P¯ that is a convex combination
of distributions in P . More formally, suppose that a P¯ is in the form of ∑ri=1 θiP (i), where P (i) ∈ P , for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r}. Then, for a (P, D)-valid mechanism Q with distortion set {Di} we have
M∑
i=1
P¯iDi =
M∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
θjP
(j)
i Di (26a)
=
r∑
j=1
θj
M∑
i=1
P
(j)
i Di (26b)
≤
r∑
j=1
θjD = D. (26c)
Thus, Q is also a valid mechanism for P¯ and any P can be extended to its convex hull without loss of generality.
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C. Proof of Lemma 2
Without loss of generality, let P1 ≥ P2 ≥ . . . ≥ PM for any P ∈ P . We now show that there exists an
optimal mechanism with Q with D1 ≤ D2 ≤ . . . ≤ DM . Let QˆXˆ|X be some optimal mechanism such that
DˆT (1) ≤ DˆT (2) ≤ . . . ≤ DˆT (M), for some permutation T . Then, let Q∗Xˆ|X = QˆT−1(Xˆ)|T−1(X). Clearly, we have
D∗1 ≤ D∗2 ≤ · · · ≤ D∗M and DP(Qˆ) = DP(Q∗). Finally, Q∗Xˆ|X is a (P, D)-valid mechanism, because:
M∑
i=1
PiD
∗
i ≤
M∑
i=1
PiD
∗
T (i) =
M∑
i=1
PiDˆi ≤ D. (27)
D. Proof of Theorem 1: Class I source sets
We now determine the optimal mechanism for Class I and show that it is indeed the conjectured mechanism
in [1]. From Remark 4, we know that we can replace P with conv(P) without loss of generality, and henceforth our
results hold for conv(P). We begin by assuming to the contrary that there exists a (P, D)-valid mechanism QXˆ|X
with lower risk guarantees than conjectured in [1], i.e. DP(Q) < log(M − 1) 1−DD for 0 < D < M−1M . For any
Q with DP(Q) < DP(QD), we require that QXˆ|X(j|i) > eDP(QD)QXˆ|X(j|j), for at least one pair (i, j), i 6= j.
Thus, by summing over all columns in QXˆ|X and recalling that e
DP(QD) = 1−DD (M − 1), we have
M =
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
Q(j|i) (28a)
>
M∑
j=1
Q(j|j) +∑
i 6=j
Q(i|i)
eDP(QD)
 (28b)
=
M∑
j=1
[
(1−Dj) +
(M − 1)−∑i 6=j Di
eDP(QD)
]
(28c)
= M −
M∑
j=1
Dj +
M(M − 1)
eDP(QD)
− M − 1
eDP(QD)
M∑
j=1
Dj (28d)
=
(
M − 1
eDP(QD)
+ 1
)M − M∑
j=1
Dj
 (28e)
=
(
1
1−D
)M − M∑
j=1
Dj
 . (28f)
Therefore
M∑
j=1
(1−Q(j|j)) =
M∑
j=1
Dj > MD. (29)
This, however, contradicts satisfying the distortion constraint for the uniform distribution.
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E. Proof of Theorem 2: Class II source sets
We now prove Theorem 2, which exactly characterizes ∗DP(P, D) for the Class II source sets as introduced in
Definition 1. To this end, we first define distortion levels
D(k) , max
P∈P
M∑
i=M−k+1
Pi, 1 ≤ k ≤M. (30)
such that for any k, D(k) corresponds to the case wherein at most k− 1 letters of the input are suppressed and the
output alphabet size is at least M − k, if D < D(k). On the other hand, for D ≥ D(k), the output alphabet size
may be suppressed by k or more elements. Through the following lemma, we first prove that perfect privacy, i.e.
zero leakage, can be achieved if and only if D ≥ D(M−1).
Lemma 5: ∗DP(P, D) = 0 if and only if D ≥ D(M−1).
Proof: We first prove the converse and show that ∗DP(P, D) = 0 only if D ≥ D(M−1). Let Q be a (P, D)-
valid mechanism with DP(Q) = 0. This implies all elements of the ith column have the same value, namely ai,
where 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1 and
∑M
i=1 ai = 1. Hence, the corresponding distortion values for Q are Di = 1− ai,∀i, where
0 ≤ Di ≤ 1 and
∑M
i=1Di = M − 1. Also, recall that for any distribution P , we have P1 ≥ P2 ≥ . . . ≥ PM .
Therefore, by replacing D1 with zero and Di, i > 1 with one, we can further lower bound the distortion as∑M
i=1 PiDi ≥
∑M
i=2 Pi. Note that Q is a (P, D)-valid mechanism, and therefore
∑M
i=2 Pi ≤ D. Taking the
maximum over all P ∈ P gives D(M−1) = maxP∈P
∑M
i=2 Pi ≤ D.
For proving the achievability, i.e. ∗DP(P, D) = 0 for D ≥ D(M−1), consider the mechanism with zero elements
everywhere except the first column where all entries are 1, i.e. Q(i|j) = 0, if i > 1, and Q(i|j) = 1, if i = 1. This
mechanism achieves ∗DP(P, D) = 0 and the distortion is bounded by
max
P∈P
M∑
i=1
PiDi = max
P∈P
M∑
i=2
Pi = D
(M−1) ≤ D. (31)
We now restrict ourselves to 0 ≤ D ≤ D(M−1), and in the following collection of lemmas we prove structural
conditions on the optimal mechanisms for Class II sources. We first describe the need for different distortion
levels, and then provide achievability and converse proofs. In particular, as the distortion increases there are specific
distortion values at which the support of output is allowed to shrink more. The following lemma captures this
observation precisely.
Lemma 6: For a k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} and D < D(k), no (P, D)-valid mechanism can have an output support set
with size of more than (M − k).
Proof: For any P ∈ P , any mechanism with k or more all-zero columns will result in an average distortion∑M
i=1 PiDi, which is strictly greater than
∑M
i=M−k+1 Pi because at least k elements in the set {Di}Mi=1 are equal
to one. Hence, for D < D(k), no mechanism with k or more all-zero columns can be (P, D)-valid.
Recall that without loss of generality, we can assume a given Class II source set has the ordering P1 ≥ P2 ≥
. . . ≥ PM , for any P ∈ P . Considering this ordering, we now prove the following lemma.
Lemma 7: In order to achieve ∗DP(P, D), it suffices to consider only those (P, D)-valid mechanisms for which
the distortion set {Di}Mi=1 is sorted in the ascending order, i.e. D1 ≤ D2 ≤ . . . ≤ DM .
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Proof: Let QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗(P, D), and let {Di}Mi=1 be a distortion vector which is not necessarily ordered. Let
T (·) be a permutation that sorts the distortions, so that DT (1) ≤ DT (2) ≤ . . . ≤ DT (M). Consider a mechanism
QT (Xˆ)|T (X) with {DT (i)}Mi=1 as its corresponding distortion vector. Since the set of elements in each column is the
same in both QXˆ|X and QT (Xˆ)|T (X), DP(QXˆ|X) = DP(QT (Xˆ)|T (X)). Moreover, QT (Xˆ)|T (X) is also a (P, D)-
valid mechanism, because P1 ≥ . . . ≥ PM (see Remark 1) and DT (1) ≤ . . . ≤ DT (M) imply
∑M
i=1 PiDT (i) ≤∑M
i=1 PiDT (i) ≤ D. Thus, QT (Xˆ)|T (X) ∈ Q∗(P, D), and it suffices to only consider mechanisms that have {Di}Mi=1
with increasing order.
Using these lemmas, we now present a converse proof by exploiting the definition of differential privacy. We
provide a sequence of properties that any optimal mechanism must satisfy. We can therefore obtain a lower bound
on the leakage by minimizing parameters of those properties. Then, we present an achievable scheme by providing
a mechanism that achieves the minimum value given by the converse.
1) Converse: We now prove a lower bound on ∗DP(P, D) for 0 < D < D(M−1). We first define critical pairs
in a matrix and then introduce a matrix coloring scheme to prove specific properties of the optimal mechanism.
We illustrate this definition and the properties using Figure 8.
Definition 7: For a mechanism QXˆ|X with DP(QXˆ|X) > 0, a critical pair in QXˆ|X is a pair of elements
{Q(k|i), Q(k|j)} in a non-zero column, such that QXˆ|X(k|i) = exp(DP(QXˆ|X))QXˆ|X(k|j).
Note that there exists at least one critical pair, but in general if there are multiple critical pairs in different columns
of a matrix Q, they may have different values. However, their ratio needs to be equal to exp(DP(Q)). Furthermore,
note that not all columns may have a critical pair. However, the maximal ratio of two elements in any column is
at most exp(DP(Q)).
We color the entries of non-zero columns of any given matrix Q black, white or red as follows:
• An element is colored black if it is the larger element in a critical pair.
• An element is colored red if it is the smaller element in a critical pair.
• All other elements are colored white.
Remark 8: Note that if a black element is decreased (or a red is increased), either the DP(·) of the matrix has
to decrease, or that element can no longer be black (red).
Our proof involves manipulating the elements of Q while maintaining it as a valid mechanism: any change in
Q that neither increases a black element nor decreases a red element will keep DP(QXˆ|X) at most equal to its
previous value.
Definition 8: For any 0 ≤ k ≤ M − 1, let Q(k)(P, D) be the set of all (P, D)-valid mechanisms with k all-
zero columns. Also let Q∗(k)(P, D) ⊂ Q(k)(P, D) be the set of mechanisms with the smallest DP(·) among all
mechanisms in Q(k)(P, D).
In the following lemmas and propositions, a sub-matrix of Q induced by rows from imin to imax and columns
from jmin to jmax is denoted by Q(jmin : jmax|imin : imax).
Lemma 8: For a given 0 < D < D(M−1) and 0 ≤ k ≤ M − 1, there exists a Qk
Xˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
(P, D) with the
August 21, 2017 DRAFT
19
distortions D1 ≤ D2 ≤ . . . ≤ DM such that
DP(Q
k
Xˆ|X) = log(M − 1− k)
1−
∑M−k
i=2 Di
M−1−k
D1
. (32)
Proof: Denote those mechanisms Q∗(k)(P, D) that have the smallest ∑Mi=1Di by Q∗(k)MS (P, D), where MS
in the subscript stands for “Minimum Sum”. Through five sequential claims, we now show that there exists a
QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D) with a specific color structure as shown in Figure 8 and DP(QXˆ|X) is given by (32).
 
 
 
W/R R  R 0  0 
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  ⋱   ⋱  
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Fig. 8: For class II source sets, optimal mechanisms with k all-zero columns have at most one non-black diagonal
element, while all other non-zero off diagonal elements are either red or white.
For any mechanism QXˆ|X with k all-zero columns (or in other words, with k of its Dis being equal to 1),
without loss of generality we can assume that columns M −k+ 1 to M are the all-zero ones due to Lemma 7. Let
Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : (M − k)) and Q(1 : (M − k)|(M − k + 1) : M) be sub-matrices of any given Q. Then there
exists a QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D) that satisfies the following claims sequentially. In other words, each claim i states
that there exists at least one QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D) among all the ones satisfying the previous claims {1, . . . , i−1},
such that the statement of claim i is true.
Claim 1: No row is all black (or all red) in Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : M).
Proof: Assume the contrary that the ith row in Q(1 : (M−k)|1 : M) is all black for any QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D).
Consider the ratio DP(Q) = log
Q(1|i)
Q(1|j) , where Q(1|j) is the red element associated with Q(1|i) which is black,
i.e. Q(1|j) and Q(1|i) form critical pairs. Also note that for any other 2 < l ≤ M − k, Q(l|i) ≥ Q(l|j). Now, if
DP(Q) > 0, we have
1 = Q(1|i) +
M−k∑
l=2
Q(l|i) > Q(1|j) +
M−k∑
l=2
Q(l|j) = 1, (33)
which is a contradiction. Otherwise, if DP(Q) = 0, by Lemma 5 D ≥ D(M−1), which is also a contradiction to our
assumption of 0 < D < D(M−1) in the beginning of converse proof. The proof for no row with all red elements
is similar.
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Claim 2: All the off-diagonal elements of a row in Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : M) have the same color.
Proof: Take an arbitrary mechanism QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D) that Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : M) satisfies Claim 1. Fix
a row i, and let the number of off-diagonal elements in row i of Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : M) with each of the colors
black, white and red be nB , nW and nR respectively, where nB + nW + nR = M − 1 − k. If only one of nR,
nW or nB is non-zero, then the claim is satisfied. We split the remaining scenarios into two cases and show that
in each it is sufficient to make all off-diagonal elements of the ith row white.
• If nR, nB > 0, then there exists an arbitrarily small δ > 0 such that each of the off-diagonal black elements can
be decreased by δnB , and each of the off-diagonal red elements can be increased by
δ
nR
. Consider a Q′ which
is identical to Q everywhere except for a segment of the i-th row Q′(1 : (M−k)|i). For 1 ≤ j ≤M−k, j 6= i,
let Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i) − δnB if Q(j|i) is black, Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i) + δnR if Q(j|i) is red, and Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i)
if Q(j|i) is white. Note that it does not matter if nW = 0 or not, because the white off-diagonal elements
Q′(1 : (M − k)|i) will not be changed.
• If nR = 0, nW , nB > 0 (or nB = 0, nW , nR > 0), then there exists an arbitrarily small δ > 0 such that
each of off-diagonal white elements can be increased (or decreased) by δnW , and each of off-diagonal black
elements (or red elements) can be decreased (or increased) by δnB (or
δ
nR
). Consider a Q′ which is identical
to Q everywhere except for Q′(1 : (M − k)|i). For 1 ≤ j ≤ M − k, j 6= i, let Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i) − δnB if
Q(j|i) is black and Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i) + δnW if Q(j|i) is white (or Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i) + δnR if Q(j|i) is red and
Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i)− δnW if Q(j|i) is white), and Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i) elsewhere.
In both cases Q′ has the same off-diagonal row sum and the same set of {Di}Mi=1 as Q, but for sufficiently
small δ, Q′ will still be a valid row stochastic matrix and none of the elements in Q′(1 : (M − k)|1 : M)
become 1 or 0. Thus, Q′ would still be a (P, D)-valid mechanism. Besides, all off-diagonal elements in row i
of Q′, i /∈ {a1, a2, · · · , ak}, will be white or otherwise we should have a smaller DP(Q′Xˆ|X) due to Remark 8,
which contradicts our first assumption that QXˆ|X ∈ Qk
∗
(P, D). In this construction, all off-diagonal elements of
Q′(1 : (M − k)|1 : M) in rows other than i are colored the same as Q without affecting the average distortion,
while keeping DP(Q′) ≤ DP(Q) and thus Q′ ∈ Q∗(k)MS (P, D). This operation can be done for each row i repeatedly,
to get the final Q′ to satisfy the claim.
Remark 9: As a result of Claims 1 and 2, all the off-diagonal elements in Q(1 : (M − k)|(M − k+ 1) : M) are
white.
Claim 3: If a diagonal element in Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : (M − k)) is not black then all off-diagonal elements of
Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : (M − k)) in the same row are red.
Proof: Take an arbitrary QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D) satisfying Claims 1 and 2, and for some 1 ≤ i ≤M−k suppose
Q(i|i) is red or white. By Claim 2, all elements in the set {Q(j|i) : j 6= i, 1 ≤ j ≤ M − k} have the same color.
Assume to the contrary that they are not all red, so they are all black or white. Consider a Q′ which is equal to Q,
except in Q′(1 : (M − k)|i) where Q′(i|i) = Q(i|i) + δ and Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i)− δM−k−1 for j 6= i, 1 ≤ j ≤M − k.
For sufficiently small δ > 0 this is also a (P, D)-valid mechanism. Although DP(Q′Xˆ|X) remains unchanged due
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to Remark 8, we have
M∑
i=1
D′i =
M∑
i=1
(1−Q′(i|i)) <
M∑
i=1
(1−Q(i|i)) =
M∑
i=1
Di, (34)
where D′i is the distortion of i
th element under Q′. This clearly contradicts the assumption that Q ∈ Q∗(k)MS (P, D).
Claim 4: There is at most one non-black element on the diagonal of Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : (M − k)).
Proof: Take an arbitrary QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D) satisfying all previous claims. Assume the contrary that there
are at least two non-black diagonal elements Q(i|i) and Q(j|j), (i 6= j, i, k ≤M−k). Thus, Q(i|j) is red by Claim
3, which implies that there exists a k 6= j where Q(i|k) is black, because there should be a black element for each
red element in a column. However, k 6= i because we already know that Q(i|i) is non-black. Thus, Q(i|k) has to
be an off-diagonal black element in Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : M), which is contradictory to our first assumption of Q
satisfying all previous claims, including Claim 1 and 2. Therefore, at most one diagonal element is non-black.
Claim 5: The only possible non-black element along the diagonal of Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : (M − k)) is the one
corresponding to the smallest, or one of the smallest Dis.
Proof: Take an arbitrary QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D) satisfying all previous claims. Let the diagonal element in row
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ M − k, be non-black. We show that for any j 6= i, 1 ≤ j ≤ M − k, Dˆj ≥ Dˆi. By Claim 3, we know
that any other off-diagonal entry in row i of Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : (M − k)), including Q(j|i) is red. We also know
that Q(j|j) is black and other entries in row j of Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : (M − k)), including Q(i|j), are either all
red or all white due to Claims 1 and 2. Thus, for all 1 ≤ k ≤M − k other than i or j we have Q(k|j) ≥ Q(k|i)
because Q(k|j) is either red or white, and Q(k|i) is red, where both of them are in the same column. Since any
row has to sum up to one, summing over rows i and j results in
Q(j|j) +Q(i|j) ≤ Q(i|i) +Q(j|i). (35)
Besides, since Q(j|j) is black, Q(j|i) is either red or white, Q(i|j) is red, and Q(i|i) is either red or white, we
have
Q(j|j)
Q(j|i) >
Q(i|i)
Q(i|j) . (36)
We now show that
1− Dˆj = Q(j|j) ≤ Q(i|i) = 1− Dˆi. (37)
Assume the contrary that Q(j|j) > Q(i|i). Thus, by (35) we have
0 < Q(j|j)−Q(i|i) ≤ Q(j|i)−Q(i|j), (38)
which means Q(j|j)−Q(i|i)Q(j|i)−Q(i|j) ≤ 1. However, (36) shows that
Q(j|j)−Q(i|i)
Q(j|i)−Q(i|j) ≥
Q(j|j)
Q(j|i) >
Q(i|i)
Q(i|j) ≥ 0, (39)
which means
Q(j|j)−Q(i|i) > Q(j|i)−Q(i|j) (40)
because eDP(Q) = Q(j|j)Q(j|i) > 1, which contradicts (38).
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The claims above imply that for D1 as one of the smallest {Di}M−ki=1 , all the other diagonal elements are black,
and the non-zero elements in the row corresponding to D1 are all red. This implies that for each red Q(j|1), j 6= i,
there exists a diagonal element 1 −Dj in the same column j which is eDP(Q) times bigger than the red element
Q(j|1). The proof is completed by summing over row 1 entries and solving for DP.
Let 0 ≤ k ≤M −1. Lemma 8 provides a formula for the optimal DP(·) among (P, D)-valid mechanisms with k
all-zero columns, in terms of their corresponding distortion values {Di}M−ki=1 . Besides, no mechanism with at least
k all-zero columns can be (P, D)-valid for D < D(k) due to Lemma 6. Thus, for any k and D(k) ≤ D ≤ D(k+1),
a lower bound on ∗DP(P, D) can be derived by taking the minimum over 0 ≤ l ≤ k and all (P, D)-valid sets of
{Di}Mi=1 that satisfy (M −1−k)
1−
∑M−k
i=2
Di
M−1−k
D1
≥ 1, or equivalently ∑M−ki=1 Di ≤M −1. Moreover, for a mechanism
with k all-zero columns we have Di = 1 for i > M − k, and thus {Di}Mi=1 can be (P, D)-valid if and only if
{Di}M−ki=1 is (P, D − D(k))-valid, i.e.
∑M−k
i=1 PiDi ≤ D − D(k). This result in (10) and completes the proof of
the lower bound in Theorem 2.
We now proceed to the special case where D < D(1). For proving ∗DP(P, D) ≥ log(M − 1) 1−DD , it suffices to
show that ∗
(0)
DP (P, D) is greater than or equal to log(M − 1) 1−DD . We need the following Lemma.
Lemma 9: Let {ai}ni=1, {bi}ni=1, and {a′i}ni=1 be a collection of real numbers between 0 and 1, such that
n∑
i=1
ai =
n∑
i=1
a′i, (41)
and b1 ≤ b2 ≤ . . . ≤ bn. If a′1 ≥ a1 and a′i ≤ ai for i = 2, 3, · · · , n, then
n∑
i=1
a′ibi ≤
n∑
i=1
aibi. (42)
Then, assume the contrary that for some D < D(1), all mechanisms in Q∗(P, D) achieve a strictly smaller
DP(·) than log(M − 1) 1−DD . From Lemma 8 we know that there exists an optimal mechanism QXˆ|X with the set
of distortions {Di}Mi=1, such that DP(Q) is given by (32), and without loss of generality D1 ≤ D2 ≤ · · · ≤ DM
due to Lemma 7. Hence, the contrary assumption is that there exists an optimal QXˆ|X such that
∗DP(Q, D) = DP(QXˆ|X) = log(M − 1)
1−
∑M
i=2Di
M−1
D1
(43a)
< log(M − 1)1−D
D
. (43b)
Thus:
(1−D)D1 + D
M − 1
M∑
i=2
Di > D. (44)
On the other hand, since QXˆ|X is supposed to satisfy the distortion constraint for any P ∈ P , including P ∗ =
argmaxP∈PPM , we have
M∑
i=1
P ∗i Di = P
∗
1D1 +
M∑
i=2
P ∗i Di (45a)
= (1−D)D1 + D
M − 1
M∑
i=2
Di ≤ D, (45b)
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where (45b) is in view of Lemma 9 and the fact that D ≤ D(1) implies P ∗i ≥ DM−1 for i = 2, 3, · · · ,M and
P ∗1 ≤ 1−D. Obviously (45b) contradicts (44). Thus, for 0 ≤ D ≤ D(1), we have
∗DP(Q, D) ≥ log(M − 1)
1−D
D
. (46)
2) Achievability: First, we show that for 0 ≤ D < D(1), the optimal leakage in (9) is achievable. Consider the
following mechanism
Q(j|i) =
1−D, i = j,D
M−1 , i 6= j.
(47)
Observe that Q is (P, D)-valid and DP(Q) = log(M − 1) 1−DD . Therefore, the lower bound in (46) is tight and
∗DP(P, D) = log(M − 1) 1−DD for 0 ≤ D < D(1).
We now prove that the lower bound in (9) is achievable for D(1) ≤ D < D(M−1). To this end, we construct the
following mechanism. For any given 0 ≤ k ≤M − 1 and the optimal set {D∗i }M−1i=1 in (10), consider the following
mechanism.
Q(k)
∗
(j|i) =

1−D∗i , i = j ≤M − k,
Di
1−D∗j∑
l 6=i 1−D∗l , i 6= j, i, j < M − k,
Q(k)
∗
(j|M − k), i > M − k, j ≤M − k,
0, j > M − k.
(48)
We now verify that DP(Q(k)
∗
) = (M − 1− k) 1−
∑M−k
i=2
D∗i
M−1−k
D∗1
. Since each of the last k rows in the above matrix are
equal to the (M − k)th row, and the last k columns are all equal to zero, it suffices to check the DP(·) for the
square matrix formed by the first M − k rows and columns. The ratio of any two elements in the same column in
Q(k)
∗
belongs to the set {c1, c2, . . . , cM−k}, where
ci = (M − 1− k)
1−
∑
j 6=iDj
M−1−k
Di
. (49)
From Lemma 7 we have that D1 ≤ . . . ≤ DM−k, which in turn implies that for any 0 ≤ j ≤M − k:
(M − 1− k)1−
∑M−k
i=2 Di
M−1−k
D1
≥ (M − 1− k)1−
∑
i6=j Di
M−1−k
Dj
. (50)
Therefore, DP(Q(k)
∗
) = (M − 1− k) 1−
∑M−k
i=2
Di
M−1−k
D1
.
F. Proof of Theorem 3: Class III source sets
Recall that a Class III source set P can be written as a union of Class II source sets as P = ∪
T∈TP
P|T .
Furthermore, each of these partitions P|T can be mapped to S0 with the appropriate permutation to get P|T . We
write the intersection and union of the mapped partitions as P∩ and P∪, respectively. Since P∩ and P∪ are Class
II source sets, we can compute the optimal leakage and the corresponding mechanism for these two sets. Moreover,
mapping P∪ and P∩ back into the original partitions results in two sets PUB and PLB that contain and are contained
in P , respectively.
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Formally, let
PLB = ∪T∈TPT−1(P∩), (51a)
PUB = ∪T∈TPT−1(P∪). (51b)
For the P shown in Figure 2 and the corresponding P∪ and P∩ in Figure 3, Figure 9 below illustrates the PLB
and PUB.
P1
P3
P2
𝒮0
𝑈𝐵
P1
P3
P2
𝒮0
𝐿𝐵
Fig. 9: A source set P and its folded versions.
Recall that for two sets P1 and P2, if P1 ⊆ P2, then ∗DP(P1, D) ≥ ∗DP(P2, D). Thus, it suffices to show the
following:
(1) PLB ⊆ P ⊆ PUB, and
(2) The optimal DP leakage for PLB and PUB are given by
∗DP(PLB, D) = ∗DP:III(P∩, D, TP), (52)
∗DP(PUB, D) = ∗DP:III(P∪, D, TP), (53)
where ∗DP:III(·) is defined in (16).
Proof of (1): For each T ∈ TP , since P∩ ⊆ P|T we have T−1(P∩) ⊆ P|T . After taking union over all T ∈ TP ,
we have PLB ⊆ P . One can immediately show that P ⊆ PUB.
Proof of (2): We first prove (52). A similar argument proves (53). Recall that PLB = ∪T∈TPT−1(P∩), and thus,
for any P ∈ P∩ and T ∈ TP we have T−1(P ) ∈ PLB. This means that for any given (PLB, D)-valid mechanism
QXˆ|X , QT (Xˆ)|T (X) is also (PLB, D)-valid. Recall that DP(Q) is a convex function of Q due to Lemma 1. This
implies that there exists an optimal mechanism achieving ∗DP(PLB, D) for which
DT (i) = Di, for any T ∈ TP , i = 1, . . . ,M. (54)
Hence, it suffices to search over only those (P∩, D)-valid mechanism that satisfy (54) in order to find (k)∗DP (PLB, D).
Furthermore, since P∩ is a Class II source set, we can use the results from Theorem 2. We now show ∗DP(PLB, D) =
∗DP:III(P∩, D, TP).
First consider the case where D ≥ M−1M . Clearly, choosing Q(i|j) = 1M achieves ∗DP(PLB, D) = 0, while the
distortion constraint is also satisfied.
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For D < M−1M , similar to the proof for Theorem 2, we first restrict the set of mechanisms to those that have a
fixed number k of all-zero columns, k = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1. For any such k, the optimal leakage is given by (17),
where the third constraint is a result of (54). Note that (17) results from the addition of the constraint in (54) to the
constraints in (10) for a Class II source set. The optimal ∗DP(PLB, D) is then the minimum of (k)
∗
DP:III(P∩, D, TP)
over all k, resulting in (16).
Finally, for D < D(1), analogous to Theorem 2, we can still show that the optimal mechanism is symmetric.
Recall that for a Class II source set P∩ and D < D(1), the optimal mechanism achieving ∗DP(P∩, D) is symmetric,
and thus, does not violate (54). Hence, we have
∗DP:III(P∩, D, TP) = ∗DP(P∩, D) = log
(
(M − 1)1−D
D
)
. (55)
Note that in contrast to Theorem 2, we no longer have distortion thresholds D(2), D(3), . . . , D(M−2), where in each
of them only mechanisms with specific number of all-zero columns are allowed. This is due to the constraint in
(54), which may not allow a gradual shrinking of output support set.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have quantified the privacy-utility tradeoff for a dataset under different assumptions on distribu-
tion knowledge (classes) and for Hamming distortion using differential privacy as the leakage metric. Specifically,
we have looked at three types of source classes. In fact, we have shown that the optimal mechanism for a Class I
source set is symmetric. We have also characterized the optimal leakage for the ordered Class II source sets. An
interesting observation about source Class II is that as the distortion increases, more and more mechanisms that
allow a reduction in the output space need to be considered. For any arbitrary set in the simplex that is not a Class
I or Class II source set, which we refer to as a Class III source set, we have used the results for Class II source
sets to develop upper and lower bounds on the optimal leakage.
When a statistical utility constraint needs to be satisfied, access to source dataset knowledge can be exploited
to obtain lesser leakage. What our work shows is that if very little is known about the source distribution, the
naive approach of symmetrically distorting the data is optimal. However, when partial or complete knowledge is
available, lower leakages can be achieved by exploiting that knowledge.
Finally, we have also compared the minimal DP leakage to the minimal IT leakage for the same source set.
In fact, perfect privacy can be achieved for both metrics and under worst case Hamming distortion in the same
distortion region.
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